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Save it for the Judge?  
A Case Study on the Effects of Big Money on State Judicial Elections  
and the Call for Stronger Recusal Rules 
 




Elected judges take an oath to be impartial in upholding the law. This is 
easily called into question when judges hear a case from parties that 
contributed large amounts of money into their judicial campaigns. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court was once considered a model of an impartial 
and non-partisan state court system. However, state politics and U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence have led to developments that have 
damaged the court’s reputation, politicized the court, and undermined 
the legitimacy of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Many interest groups 
contribute large amounts into judicial campaigns to get judges elected 
who they hope will rule in their favor and further interest groups’ 
agendas. As judicial elections around the country become more expensive 
and politicized, judicial elections begin to look like partisan races. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court case study serves as an example for other states 
who elect their judges as to what can happen if they do not amend their 
recusal rules regarding campaign contributions or fail to enact 
mechanisms to ensure judges properly recuse themselves when necessary. 
We need an impartial judiciary, smart and fair judges to ensure due 
process and to preserve the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For years the Wisconsin Supreme Court was considered an exemplary legal 
body.1 Before 2007, the Wisconsin Supreme Court “had a national reputation for 
having among the most respected, impartial, non-partisan, fair and trusted state 
 
*  Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2019. I am thankful to Professor Charles G. Geyh 
for his guidance in researching and writing this Comment and for sparking my interest in the 
field of judicial conduct. I am also thankful to the staff of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social 
Equality for their edits and feedback throughout the editing process. I dedicate this to Comment 
to Carolyn Haney, whose support I can always count on and without whom life would be much 
less enjoyable.  
1  See Emily Mills, The Unbelievable True Story of Wisconsin’s Supreme Court and What’s at Stake 
(Updated), REWIRE.NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018, 1:15 PM), 
https://rewire.news/article/2018/03/22/unbelievable-true-story-wisconsins-supreme-court-whats-
stake/. 
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court systems in the nation.”2 Many Wisconsinites believed that their state courts 
were above politics, impartial, and uncompromised by outside lobbying groups and 
campaign contributions.3 The case today presents a different story. A significant 
influx of outside spending on campaign contributions has destroyed the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s reputation, polarized the court, damaged the public’s perception of 
it, and undermined the legitimacy of the judiciary.4 
Statements and actions by the conservative Wisconsin Supreme Court 
justices have made it clear that they do not see an issue with the state’s current 
recusal rule as it applies to campaign contributions. U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has opened the floodgates to an increase of campaign contributions 
that has helped the Wisconsin legislature enact laws allowing unlimited campaign 
coordination and contributions. In this Comment I argue why Wisconsin needs to 
amend its recusal rules, and present and evaluate proposed reforms that the state 
should implement given the erosion of judicial campaign spending safeguards in the 
last decade. 
In order for the public to trust and have confidence in the judiciary, it is 
important that judges not only be fair and impartial in upholding the rule of law 
but that they appear so to the public.5 Judicial recusal, or disqualification, is “the 
removal of a judge (voluntary or otherwise) from a case because the judge has—or 
may appear to have—an interest or involvement in . . . the case” that would prevent 
him or her from reaching an unbiased decision.6 Disqualification is important in 
ensuring parties have a fair hearing and cases are adjudicated by an impartial 
judge.7 Disqualification is a reactive remedy, meaning that it comes into play after a 
judge has done something that calls his impartiality into question.8 The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and a state’s constitution, statutes, and case law 
govern recusal in state courts.9 Elected judges take an oath to be impartial. Judges’ 
 
2  Jay Heck, Stronger Judicial Recusal Rules Vital for an Impartial State Judiciary, PR WATCH 
(Feb. 12, 2018, 12:05PM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2018/02/13319/stronger-judicial-recusal-
rules-vital-impartial-state-judiciary.  
3  Id. 
4  See Mills, supra note 1.  
5  See Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 690–93 
(2011).  
6  RUSSELL WHEELER & MALIA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
JUDICIAL RECUSAL PROCEDURES, JUDICIAL RECUSAL PROCEDURES 1 (2017), 
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judicial_recusal_procedures.pdf; see 
also Definitions, JUD. DISQUALIFICATION RESOURCE CTR, http://www.judicialrecusal.com/judicial-
disqualification-definition/ (“Technically ‘recusal’ often refers to the act by which a judge recuses 
herself, whereas ‘disqualification’ refers to the removal of a judge on a party’s motion, but many 
judges have used the terms ‘recusal’ and ‘disqualification’ interchangeably.”). I use the words 
"recusal" and "disqualification" interchangeably. 
7  CHARLES G. GEYH, COURTING PERIL 105 (2016). 
8  Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Elections in the Aftermath of White, Caperton, and Citizens 
United, THE ADVOCATE, Winter 2010, at 78, 80. 
9  WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 1. 
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impartiality can easily be called into question when they hear a case from parties 
that contributed large amounts of money into their judicial campaigns. Ideally, in 
these instances, judges should recuse themselves from a case.  
Part I begins by presenting the Wisconsin Supreme Court as a case study, 
including the rise of big money in judicial elections, the development of the current 
recusal rules, and their effects on the court as a whole. Part II explores some of the 
underlying causes for the state of today’s Wisconsin’s Supreme Court elections 
including major U.S. Supreme Court decisions and changes to Wisconsin’s campaign 
finance laws. Part III proposes and evaluates reforms to Wisconsin’s current recusal 
rule as well as enforcement mechanisms to restore legitimacy and confidence in the 
court. Part IV then briefly presents some general takeaways from the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court case study as state judicial elections around the country become 
more expensive and politicized. Finally, Part V discusses the last three Wisconsin 
Supreme Court elections and how those outcomes have shaped the court.  
There is a clear divide along ideological lines regarding views of the current 
recusal rule. Moreover, both liberal-backed candidates and conservative-backed 
candidates in recent elections have been pretty transparent about their stance on 
the state’s recusal rule. Politics and ideologies aside, Wisconsin needs to adopt a 
stronger recusal rule given how expensive judicial elections have become. To get the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court back on track, any notions of partiality and perceptions 
of bias need to be eliminated.  
I.  THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT CASE STUDY 
A. A Brief Overview of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court is the state’s highest court and is composed of 
seven justices.10 The court has appellate jurisdiction over all Wisconsin courts.11 
Each justice is elected to serve a ten-year term in statewide, non-partisan 
elections.12 The Code of Judicial Conduct, under Chapter 60 of the state’s Supreme 
Court Rules, lays out the ethics rules that govern the members of the Wisconsin 
judiciary.13  
The rules’ language shows us that Wisconsin recognizes the importance of 
ensuring that impropriety, or the appearance of impropriety, be kept out of legal 
proceedings. Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.04(1) states that “a judge may not 
be swayed by partisan interests” and will perform all judicial duties “without 
 
10  Supreme Court, WIS. CT. SYS., https://wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/index.htm (last updated Dec. 
17, 2018). 
11  Id.  
12  The current Wisconsin Supreme Court is made up of Chief Justice Patience D. Roggensack, 
Justice Ann W. Bradley, Justice Annette K. Ziegler, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley, Justice Daniel 
Kelly, Justice Rebecca F. Dallet, and Justice Brian Hagedorn. See Supreme Court: Justices, WIS. 
CT. SYS., https://wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/index.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2019). 
Justice Kelly’s current terms ends on July 31, 2020, after which the Honorable Jill Karofsky will 
assume the bench as an associate justice.  
13  See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60. 
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creating or manifesting bias or prejudice.”14 Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4) states 
that a judge shall recuse himself or herself from a proceeding when the judge 
knows, or reasonably should know, that there are facts and circumstances that 
would cast doubt into the judge’s ability to be impartial in a proceeding.15 The 
disqualification rule, Wisconsin Statutes section 757.19, lays out when recusal is 
necessary.16 However, the rule does not recognize how campaign contributions can 
also lead to apparent or actual bias. In Wisconsin, a justice has the sole authority to 
decide whether to recuse himself or herself,17 and it is a subjective decision.18  
B. The Rise of Big Money in Wisconsin 
Over the last decade, big money has entered Wisconsin’s judicial elections 
with force. Interest groups have spent over $13.2 million supporting supreme court 
candidates.19   
Lincoln Caplan, a Yale Law School lecturer and research scholar, states that 
“money-fueled and often nasty judicial elections, ha[ve] intensified the turn of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court from a congenial moderately liberal institution into a 
severely divided conservative stronghold . . . [and] reduced it from one of the 
nation’s most respected state tribunals into a disgraceful mess.”20 
The story begins with the 2007 judicial election of Justice Annette K. Ziegler. 
Her campaign spent $1.4 million, which was coupled with $2.5 million and $400,000 
in undisclosed expenditures on issue ads from Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce (WMC) and the Wisconsin Club for Growth (WCFG), respectively: two 
very conservative special-interest groups.21 Justice Ziegler went on to face ethics 
charges by the Judicial Commission for not recusing herself from hearing a case in 
 
14  WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(1)(b), (e) (“A Judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially 
and diligently.”). It is worth noting that the comment to subsection (e) of the rule states, “[a] 
judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and 
brings the judiciary into disrepute.” WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(1)(e) cmt. 
15  WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(4). 
16  WIS. STAT. § 757.19 (2019). 
17  See State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853. 
18  WIS. STAT. § 757.19(2)(g) note (2019) (citing State v. Am. TV & Appliance, 443 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 
1989)). 
19  Molly Beck, Analysis: Last 6 State Supreme Court Races Attracted 13.2M in Issue Ad Spending, 
WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/analysis-last-
state-supreme-court-races-attracted-m-in-issue/article_b670e7c4-7bb5-5771-9153-
c224ce696389.html. 
20  Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER (May 5, 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-the-wisconsin-supreme-
court. 
21  See Brendan Fischer, Justices in Walker Criminal Probe Face Conflicts of Interest, PR WATCH 
(Oct. 6, 2014, 8:48 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/10/12617/justices-walker-criminal-
probe-face-conflict-interest; see also Jim Pugh, WMC: Big Stakes for Supreme Court Election, 
WIS. MANUFACTURERS & COM. (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.wmc.org/issues/wmc-taking-on-
personal-injury-lawyers. 
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which she had a clear conflict of interest.22 Justice Ziegler became the first 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice to be reprimanded by the court, which deemed 
her conduct “serious,” “willful,” and “inexcusable” and noted that the conduct 
“diminishes [the] public’s confidence in the legal system.”23 The public was not 
satisfied with the punishment and saw the reprimand as belittling the gravity of 
her violation.24 
In the 2008 judicial election, Justice Michael Gableman narrowly defeated 
Justice Louis Butler (the first incumbent to lose since 1967).25 WMC spent $2.25 
million in undisclosed money on issue ads; five-and-a-half times the amount of the 
justice’s own campaign.26  The WCFG added another $500,000.27 WMC sponsored a 
“nasty” issue ad portraying Justice Butler as being soft on crime and protecting 
criminal defendants.28 The Wisconsin Judicial Commission filed a complaint against 
Justice Gableman for knowingly misrepresenting facts in one of his campaign ads 
against his opponent.29 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision on Justice 
Gableman’s misconduct ended in a deadlock tie vote divided along partisan lines.30 
The three conservative justices argued that the ad was protected by the First 
Amendment because even though the ad was “distasteful,” it was “objectively 
true.”31 The complaint was dropped,32 but this would not be the only ethical 
violation Justice Gableman would face.33 
 
22  The case involved a bank on whose board her husband sat. See Fischer, supra note 21. 
23  Bill Lueders, Opinion, Justice, Annette Ziegler-Style: Why Settle for One Standard When You Can 
Have Two?, ISTHMUS (June 5, 2008), https://isthmus.com/opinion/opinion/justice-annette-ziegler-
style/. 
24  See Jonathan Turley, The Thin Black Line: Wisconsin Supreme Court Reprimands Justice 
Annette Ziegler – Refusing More Serious Discipline for Violating Conflicts of Interest Rules, 
JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (Jan. 4, 2008), https://jonathanturley.org/2008/01/04/the-thin-black-line-
wisconsin-supreme-court-reprimands-justice-annette-ziegler-refusing-more-serious-discipline-
for-violating-conflicts-of-interest-rules/. 
25  Pugh, supra note 21. 
26  Id. 
27  Fischer, supra note 21. 
28  Bill Mears, Big Money, Nasty Ads Highlight Wisconsin Judicial Race, CNN POL. (Mar. 31, 2008, 
12:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/31/wisconsin.judicial.race/. 
29  The issue ad in question portrayed then-Justice Butler as releasing a child molester from prison 
when he was a public defender, which resulted in another offense. See Lincoln Caplan, Justice 
for Sale, AM. SCHOLAR (June 1, 2012), https://theamericanscholar.org/justice-for-sale/. 
30  In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 61, ¶¶ 4, 108–09, 325 Wis. 
2d 579, 784 N.W.2d 605 (per curiam).  
31  Ryan J. Foley, Supreme Court Deadlocks in Gableman Ethics Case, WIS. ST. J. (July 1, 2010), 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt_and_politics/supreme-court-deadlocks-in-gableman-
ethics-case/article_059e2f86-8522-11df-83b6-001cc4c03286.html. 
32  Ethics Complaint filed Against Justice Gableman, WIS. L.J. (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:56 PM), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2012/01/10/ethics-complaint-filed-against-wis-justice/. 
33  It was discovered that Justice Gableman had received “the unpaid counsel from a law firm that 
regularly appeared before him and the court.” Justice Gableman previously ruled in favor of the 
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The amounts of campaign spending in the 2007 and 2008 elections did not go 
unnoticed. In 2009, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin petitioned the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to adopt a rule that would force a justice to recuse 
himself or herself from a case when a party had donated $1,000 or more to the 
justice’s campaign, either directly or through an interest group.34 The court rejected 
the petition by a 4-3 vote.35 Instead, in 2010, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted 
a new recusal rule by a 4-3 conservative majority that allows Wisconsin judges to 
hear cases involving their campaign contributors or sponsors of independent 
expenditures.36 This recusal “non-standard” rule was written by the Wisconsin 
Realtors Associations and WMC–two conservative interest groups and major 
contributors in many Wisconsin judicial elections.37 
Big money continued to play a role in securing conservative wins in 
Wisconsin’s judicial elections. In 2011, Justice David Prosser barely won re-election 
by a narrow margin of just over 7,000 votes.38 WMC and the WCFG spent $2 million 
and $520,000, respectively, on Justice Prosser’s re-election campaign.39  In 2013, 
WMC and the WCFG spent a total of $850,000 in campaign contributions to re-elect 
Justice Patience D. Roggensack.40 Her win secured conservative control of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.41  
The recusal rule in Wisconsin had lost its teeth. The rule, written by 
conservative parties, seemed to come in handy when conservative interest groups 
WMC and WCFG petitioned the court to shut down what became known as the 
“John Doe criminal investigations.”42 The 2012 investigation began after 
 
firm in a 4-3 decision. Recusal should have occurred as his impartiality could have easily be 
called into question. Caplan, supra note 29.  
34  See Heck, supra note 2.  
35  Id.; see also Patrick Marley, Court Adopts New Campaign Donation Rules, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (Jan. 21, 2010), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/82319592.html. 




37  WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7); see also Editorial, How to Clean Up Wisconsin Supreme Court Mess, 
CAP TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Cap Times Editorial], 
https://madison.com/ct/opinion/editorial/editorial-how-to-clean-up-wisconsin-supreme-court-
mess/article_1e935d85-faa9-5d38-b696-5c703e352088.html.  
38  Fischer, supra note 21. 
39  Once again, the money was not disclosed. Id. 
40  Id.  
41  See Bruce Murphy, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Pat Roggensack Wins Second Term as Big 
Liberal Money Sits out Race, ISTHMUS (Apr. 3, 2013), https://isthmus.com/news/news/wisconsin-
supreme-court-justice-pat-roggensack-wins-second-term-as-big-liberal-money-sits-out-race/. 
42  See Ed Pilkington, Scott Walker, the John Doe Files, and How Corporate Cash Influences U.S. 
Politics, GUARDIAN (Sep. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-
interactive/2016/sep/14/john-doe-files-scott-walker-corporate-cash-american-politics. A “John Doe 
proceeding” is an investigative tool codified in Wisconsin law used to determine whether crimes 
have been committed and by whom. WIS. STAT. § 968.26 (2015). 
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prosecutors alleged that Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker was “part of an elaborate 
effort to illegally coordinate fund-raising and spending between his campaign and 
[outside] conservative groups during efforts to recall him and several state 
senators.”43 Prosecutors asked some of the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
to recuse themselves from hearing challenges to the investigation.44 Both Justice 
Prosser and Justice Gableman, two conservative justices who won their seats by 
narrow margins in great part to conservative interest groups’ efforts, refused to 
recuse themselves from the case.45  
In July of 2015, the court’s decision in State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners 
v. Peterson closed the investigation by a 4-2 decision46 into the unlawful campaign 
coordination and declared that the coordination did not violate the law because it 
only involved issue ads.47 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that Walker’s 
campaign, which included the support of conservative groups, did not violate any 
campaign-finance laws by evading campaign finance disclosures requirements and 
contribution limits right before the 2012 recall vote.48 Justice Gableman’s majority 
opinion exculpated the groups and rewrote Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws 
allowing candidates and justices alike to “permissibly work hand in-glove with 
‘independent’ groups that take unlimited, secret donations as long as they only 
coordinate regarding issue ads.”49 Also in 2015, Walker and the legislature put the 
nail in the coffin of campaign contribution limits by repealing the longstanding 
prohibitions on campaign coordination between candidates and “independent” 
 
43  Monica Davey & Nicholas Confessore, Wisconsin Governor at Center of a Vast Fund-Raising 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/us/scott-walker-
wisconsin-governor.html. 
44  See Brendan Fischer, Prosecutor in Scott Walker Probe Asks Justices to Recuse, PR WATCH (Feb. 
13, 2015, 3:03 PM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/02/12734/walker-wisconsin-supreme-
court-recuse.  
45  See Pilkington, supra note 42; see also Mary Bottari, Cleaning Up the Courts, Citizen Hearings at 
Three Locations in Wisconsin, PR WATCH (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:14 PM), 
https://www.prwatch.org/news/2017/09/13287/cleaning-courts-citizen-hearings-three-locations-
wisconsin. 
46  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recused herself because her son was a member of a law firm 
participating in the case. See Patrick Marley & Mary Spicuzza, Wisconsin Supreme Court Ends 
John Doe Probe into Scott Walker's Campaign, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 16, 2015), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-supreme-court-ends- john-doe-probe-into-
scott-walkers-campaign-b99535414z1-315784501.html/.  
47  State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165. 
The decision interpreted Wisconsin Statute 11.01 and limited the definition of “political purpose” 
to express advocacy, leaving issue advocacy unregulated. See Amanda R. Schwarzenbart, 
Comment, Coordination is Corruption: An Argument for the Regulation of Coordinated Issue 
Advocacy Under Campaign Finance Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1493, 1507 (2017).  
48  Two Unnamed Petitioners, 2015 WI 85, ¶¶10–11; see also Patrick O’Connor, Wisconsin Court 
Ends Investigation into Scott Walker’s Recall Election Bid, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2015, 11:59 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wisconsin-court-ends-investigation-into-scott-walkers-recall-
election-bid-1437062374. 
49  Lynn Adelman, How Big Money Ruined Public Life in Wisconsin, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2017).  
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outside interest groups.50 As the law stands today, the contribution amount an 
individual can make to a state Supreme Court Race is capped at $20,000.51 Political 
parties, political action committees, legislative campaign committees, independent 
expenditure groups, and issue ad groups generally have no contribution limits.52  
The large amounts of campaign contributions in judicial elections over the 
past decade that helped the conservative justices win their seats seem to have also 
led to a decline in the collegiality among the justices. In 2012, a complaint of 
misconduct was filed against Justice Prosser due to his lack of proper decorum and 
for calling then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson “a total bitch” in the presence of 
the other justices.53 The second count in the complaint came from the liberal Justice 
Ann W. Bradley who accused Justice Prosser of choking her as the justices 
deliberated during their conference.54 Justice Prosser filed motions for the recusal of 
the rest of the justices as they had each been “a material witness and [because] two 
[justices] had reported the conduct that led to the complaint.”55 All but Justice 
Crooks, who invoked the rule of necessity, recused themselves from the case.56 
Justice Prosser did not face criminal charges,57 but these events showed the tension 
and division of the court following the Judicial Commission’s internal investigation.  
On April 7, 2015, voters considered a referendum to amend the Wisconsin 
Constitution.58 The referendum would change the selection process for the state’s 
chief justice from a seniority system to a majority vote by the seven Wisconsin 
Supreme Court justices.59 The liberal Greater Wisconsin Committee urged a vote 
against the referendum as the amendment would take the vote away from the 
people.60 Conservative supporters saw the decision as a way of making the courts 
 
50  See Heck, supra note 2.  
51  Campaign Finance: Contribution Limits, ST. WIS. ETHICS COMMISSION, 
https://ethics.wi.gov/Pages/CampaignFinance/ContributionLimits.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020). 
52  See id. 
53  Caplan, supra note 20. 
54  Frank James, Wisconsin’s Alleged High-Court Choking Incident Gets Two Probes, NPR (June 28, 
2011, 5:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2011/06/28/137480847/wisconsins-
alleged-high-court-choking-incident-gets-two-probes. 
55  Caplan, supra note 20.  
56  Wis. Judicial Comm’n v. Prosser, 2012 WI 69, 341 Wis. 2d 656, 817 N.W.2d 830. 
57  Steven Elbow, No Charges for Justice Prosser in High Court Ruckus, CAP TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011), 
https://madison.com/ct/news/local/crime_and_courts/blog/no-charges-for-justice-prosser-in-high-
court-ruckus/article_1a274f3e-cdae-11e0-9bd6-001cc4c002e0.html. 
58  Tom Kertscher, Would Wisconsin Voters No Longer Decide Who Leads the State Supreme Court?, 
POLITIFACT (Apr. 3, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2015/apr/03/greater-wisconsin-political-
fund/would-wisconsin-voters-no-longer-decide-who-leads-/; see also 2015 S.J. Res. 2, 2015–2016 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/proposals/sjr2. 
59  See Kertscher, supra note 58. 
60  Scott Bauer, Patience Roggensack Elected Chief Justice; Shirley Abrahamson Says She Still 
Holds Post, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-
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fairer by adding merit to the democratic process.61 Others saw the referendum as 
“pure political hardball” with political implications and a partisan majority attack 
on Justice Abrahamson.62 The referendum passed, and Justice Abrahamson was 
ousted from her position as Chief Justice—a position she had held since 1996.63  
Justice Roggensack became Wisconsin’s new Chief Justice by a majority 
conservative vote.64 She then went on to speak on a very conservative radio station 
known to promote Republican campaigns and conservative causes.65 Chief Justice 
Roggensack’s decision could be seen as a clear partisan message to voters—a 
conservative majority view that neither advances the court’s impartiality nor its 
democratic values. Wisconsin is now one of twenty-three states where the justices 
select their chief justice by a majority vote.66 
Wisconsin is now considered to be one of the four worst states in the country 
for its recusal standards when judges receive campaign contributions.67 The Center 
for American Progress created a grading scale to identify and evaluate states’ 
recusal rules across the country to determine whether elected judges address the 
conflict of interest that can arise from campaign contributions in million-dollar 
judicial elections.68 Wisconsin received a failing grade, with only thirty-five points, 
due in part to its recusal rule.69 The influence of money has clearly moved 
Wisconsin away from holding “non-partisan” judicial elections for the state’s 
supreme court seats.  
II. UNDERLYING CAUSES: U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
On a national level, developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
contributed to Wisconsin’s current status. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 




61  See Patrick Marley, Groups Decry Chief Justice Referendum, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 23, 
2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/blogs/news/297272861.html. 
62  Id.  
63  Bauer, supra note 60. 
64  Id. 
65  Bruce Murphy, Lady MacBeth of the Supreme Court, URB. MILWAUKEE (May 7, 2015, 10:56 AM), 
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2015/05/07/murphys-law-lady-macbeth-of-the-supreme-court/. 
66  Caplan, supra note 20. 
67  Cap Times Editorial, supra note 37. 
68  The grading criteria was partially based on the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct and reform proposals from the Brennan Center for Justice and other fair-court 
advocates, as well as the Caperton v. Massey decision. See Billy Corrier & Jake Paiva, State 
Judicial Ethics Rules Fail to Address Flood of Campaign Cash from Lawyers and Litigants, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 7, 2014, 9:33 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2014/05/07/89068/state-judicial-ethics-
rules-fail-to-address-flood-of-campaign-cash-from-lawyers-and-litigants-2/.  
69  Id.  
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be prohibited by state statutes from announcing their views on disputed legal and 
political issues.70  
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decision Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 
held that a litigant’s due process rights were violated under the Eighteenth 
Amendment when state supreme court Justice Brent Benjamin failed to recuse 
himself in an appeal after he had received over three million dollars in campaign 
donations from Massey’s chief executive officer.71 The Court asserted: 
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias–based on objective and 
reasonable perceptions–when a person with a personal stake in a 
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s 
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The 
inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the 
total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount 
spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on 
the outcome of the election.72 
The Court noted that while recusal is not always necessary when a judge received 
campaign contributions from parties to a suit, this case presented “extreme facts” 
that created the risk of actual bias rising “to an unconstitutional level.”73  
Under the standards set out in Caperton, the proper action for Justice 
Prosser and Justice Gableman should have been recusal when the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decided to cease the John Doe investigations. Because both justices 
won their seats by a narrow margin, the risk of bias was very strong.74 Ironically, 
Justice Prosser, who previously moved for the Justices’ recusal from his disciplinary 
charge,75 refused to recuse himself here when money was involved.76  
The campaign contribution landscape continued to change in 2010 when the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC.77 The Court held that under 
the First Amendment, the government may not suppress political speech on the 
 
70  536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
71  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).  
72  Id. at 884. 
73  Id. at 886–87. 
74  See Brendan Fischer, Supreme Court Challenge to WI Dark Money Probe Raises Questions of 
Judicial Ethics, PR WATCH (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:02 AM), 
https://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/02/12389/new-challenge-john-doe-raises-questions-judicial-
ethics; see also Editorial, The Ethics Collapse of Justice Michael Gableman and David Prosser, 
CAP TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://madison.com/ct/opinion/editorial/editorial-the-ethical-
collapse-of-justices-michael-gableman-and-david/article_15ace076-2fd2-5641-92ab-
f6a470c79df8.html. 
75  See Caplan, supra note 20. 
76  See Bottari, supra note 45. 
77  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.78 Thus, “unless a donor receives an agreed-
upon benefit in exchange for a contribution, the donation cannot rise to the level of 
being a corruptive influence sufficient to justify congressional regulation of the free 
speech rights of a corporation . . . providing campaign money.”79 This decision 
limited Congress’s ability to limit campaign finance.80 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy stated that there were very few campaign contributions that 
actually involved quid pro quo arrangements, and that a corporation’s independent 
expenditure did not rise to the level of corruption.81 In the dissenting opinion, 
Justice Stevens recognized and warned that the Court’s ruling would “undermine 
the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”82 This was certainly the case 
in Wisconsin. 
After Citizens United, the Wisconsin legislature and Governor Scott Walker 
made several changes to Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws that changed the 
nature of political advertising. The legislature eliminated public financing for state 
candidates in 2011,83 repealed the Impartial Justice law,84 and repealed the 
prohibitions on campaign coordination between candidates and independent 
interest groups in 2015.85 The current campaign finance laws—under Wisconsin Act 
11786—only regulate express advocacy by third-parties, leaving issue advocacy 
unregulated.87 
The decisions at both the federal and state level seemed to open the 
floodgates and introduce third-party advertisements to attack or support the 
candidates in Wisconsin judicial elections.88 The only issue ads in Wisconsin from 
 
78  Id. at 372. 
79  Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Judicial Elections and Issue Advertising: A Two State 
Study, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 579, 582 (2007). 
80  See Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 372 (2010).  
81  Id. at 357.  
82  Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83  See Bill Lueders, Public Financing of Elections a State Budget Casualty, WIS. ST. J. (July 4, 
2011), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/elections/public-financing-of-
elections-a-state-budget-casualty/article_3dfcc38a-a63f-11e0-ad5d-001cc4c03286.html. The 
system, enacted in 1978, was considered one of the best public campaign financing laws in the 
nation for limiting funding to participating candidates. See STEVEN M. LEVIN, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING IN WISCONSIN: SHOWING ITS AGE 6 (2008) (discussing how the Wisconsin Legislature’s 
previous campaign finance reform law created contribution limits, a strong campaign finance 
disclosure program, and voluntary expenditure ceilings linked to public financing programs). 
84  See Heck, supra note 2 (“[The Impartial Justice Law] had provided full public financing elections 
to candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court who voluntarily agreed to limit their total 
spending to $400,000.”). 
85  See id. 
86  See State Assemb. B. 387, 102d State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015). 
87  Brendan M. Fischer & Nicholas D. Harken, Fear of Favor: Judicial Elections and Campaigns 
Finance Law, WIS. LAW., Feb. 2018, at 36, 37. 
88  See generally Christopher Terry & Mitchell Bard, Milwaukee Radio Public File Data, 1998-2011: 
An Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising After the BCRA and Citizens United, 24 U. FLA. J.L. 
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1998 to 2009 were from third-party groups advertising to support the confirmation 
of Justice Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court.89 A 2016 study of issue 
advertisements found that there was an increase in both the amount of spending 
and the number of ads bought in statewide judicial races.90  
The money that has helped the conservative justices secure their victories 
and gain control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has compromised their integrity 
“as plainly as if they had personally solicited every dollar that helped elect them.”91 
The White decision contributed to the Wisconsin Chief Justice’s confidence in 
making bold, conservative driven statements to the public.92 Law professor Charles 
G. Geyh argues that if judicial candidates have a constitutional right to announce 
partisan affiliations, “the practical differences between partisan and nonpartisan 
elections may gradually disappear.”93  Professor Geyh proposes, among others, that 
for an independent judiciary to exist, reforms should defend the ethical 
considerations on judicial campaign conduct and encourage judicial candidates to do 
their part to reduce the impact of White.94 Merely because a judge can state their 
position on a reviewable issue before them does not mean they should do so. Strong 
recusal rules encourage the perception of an independent judiciary.  
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
A. Strong Recusal Rules Are Needed for Judicial Integrity  
In 2014, the American Bar Association (ABA) passed Resolution 105C, calling 
for states to improve their recusal rules.95 Despite Wisconsin’s history, the state has 
 
& PUB. POL’Y 157 (2013) (examining issue advertising data on broadcast radio in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin and finding that after Citizen United, the percentage of issue ads mentioning 
candidates by name had doubled). 
89  See Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An Opening for Quid Pro Quo Corruption: Issue 
Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races Before and After Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 305, 316 (2015). 
90  See Terry & Bard, supra note 79. 
91  Caplan, supra note 20. 
92  See Murphy, supra note 65.  
93  See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for 
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1273 (2008). 
94  Id. at 1279; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age 
of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, 
POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 21 (2007); CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE HIGHER GROUND: STANDARDS OF 
CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES (2000), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/The_Higher_Ground_Standards_of_Conduct_for_Judicial_
Candidates.pdf.  
95  [T]he American Bar Association urges that states and territories adopt certain judicial 
disqualification procedures which: (1) take into account the fact that certain campaign 
expenditures and contributions, including independent expenditures, made during judicial 
elections raise concerns about possible effects on judicial impartiality and independence; 
(2) are transparent; (3) provide for the timely resolution of disqualification and recusal 
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yet to improve its rules. Wisconsin must act soon. The Brennan Center for Justice, 
an institute working to reform and revitalize our country’s system of justice and 
protect our Constitutional democracy,96 has also asked for reform of recusal rules. A 
Brennan Center Report found that “[i]n the 2015-16 cycle, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court elections saw $5.9 million in spending, including $2.5 million from outside 
groups. Nearly all—91 percent—of that outside spending was from dark money 
groups that conceal their donors from the public.”97 Attorneys with the Campaign 
Legal Center, a national group that supports limits on campaign spending, have 
also argued for Wisconsin courts to revisit disqualification rules.98 At the state level, 
Common Cause, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, and the American 
Association of University Women have sought to have open dialogues on ethics 
issues, including Wisconsin’s recusal rule.99  
It seems simple to propose that Wisconsin should adopt a bright-line recusal 
rule. Such a rule could read: “A judge shall recuse himself or herself from any 
proceedings involving a party that has made any contribution to that judge’s 
election campaign.” The problem is trying to implement such a rule given the 
likelihood that an amendment would be rejected. A recusal rule in line with the 
concerns set out in Caperton,100 however, might gain support. Eleven states have 
amended their recusal rules in this manner.101 Wisconsin can model a new rule 
after Georgia’s rule, for example, which takes into account the “amount of the 
contribution”; the “timing of the contribution or support”; the “relationship of [the] 
contributor or supporter to the parties”; and whether a judge has any knowledge of 
a party’s significant campaign contribution that can reasonably call a judge’s 
impartiality into question.102 
 
motions; and (4) include a mechanism for the timely review of denials to disqualify or 
recuse that is independent of the subject judge[.] 
ABA Standing Comm. on Judicial Indep., Resolution 105C (2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2014am_hodres/105c.pdf 
96  See Programs, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, https://www.brennancenter.org/about/programs (last 
visited April 27, 2020). 
97  Press Release, Brennan Center to Examine Spending in Wisconsin Supreme Court Election, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-
release/brennan-center-examine-spending-wisconsin-supreme-court-election. 
98  See Letter from Brendan Fischer, Fed. & FEC Reform Program Dir. & Catherine Hinckley 
Kelley, State & Local Reform Program Dir., Campaign Legal Ctr, to Patience D. Roggensack, 
Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/1701commentsfischer.pdf. 
99  Cap Times Editorial, supra note 37. 
100  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).  
101  See CYNTHIA GRAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 1, 4 (2016), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Disqualifica
tioncontributions.ashx. 
102  GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11(A)(4).  
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Another rule variation which might gain more support is a recusal rule with 
specific caps on the amounts or percentages of campaign spending. As of 2016, five 
states amended their recusal rules to include a specific amount or percentage.103 
Even a rule that accounts for specific amounts coupled with the Caperton 
considerations above may garner wider support. For example, under California 
statutory law, a judge can be disqualified “for cause” if the judge has received a 
contribution in excess of $1500 from a party or lawyer in a proceeding.104 There 
have been previous attempts for a rule like this to be adopted in Wisconsin. On 
January 11, 2017, fifty-four retired Wisconsin judges concerned about the influence 
that big money has had on the State’s Supreme Court filed a petition regarding the 
current recusal rule when a party or lawyer has made a large campaign 
contribution.105 The petition sought to require recusal from a case if a party or 
attorney has contributed $10,000 or more to a justice’s campaign.106  
The petition was aimed directly at the public’s concern with the appearance 
of bias, the appearance of partiality, and the perceptions of justice being for sale—
all of which undermine the public’s respect for the judiciary and its judgment.107 
The court received several written comments both in support and in opposition of 
the petition.108 By a vote of 5-2, the court rejected the petition without holding a 
public hearing.109 Ironically, part of the justification for rejecting the petition was on 
the grounds that taking up the proposal would damage the public’s view of the 
state’s courts since judges should be able to determine on their own when they must 
step aside from a case.110  
While an amendment to Wisconsin’s recusal rule seems unlikely in the near 
future, it is perhaps better for the Wisconsin judiciary and legislature to adopt 
 
103  See GRAY, supra note 101, at 2. 
104  CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 170.1(a)(9)(A). 
105  See Rules Petition No. 17-01 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Petition 17-01], 
https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/1701petition.pdf (asking the court “[t]o establish an 
objective standard requiring recusal of disqualification of a judge when he or she has received 
the benefit of campaign contributions or assistance from a party or lawyer”).  
106  Id. at 5; see also Dan Stier, Opinion, Are Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Races Really Just About 
Money?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2018, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/01/30/wisconsin-supreme-court-recusal-
campaign-contributions-money/1078851001/. 
107  Petition 17-01, supra note 105, at 2. 
108  See Supreme Court Rules, Petition Archive: 17-01 In re Rule for Recusal, WIS. COURT SYS., 
https://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/1701.htm (last updated June 30, 2017). 
109  Cap Times Editorial, supra note 37. 
110  The motion to deny the petition was also based in part on constitutional concerns caused by the 
proposed amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution and the potential that granting the petition 
could preclude Supreme Court review in some cases. Order Denying Petition No. 17-01, In re 
Rule for Recusal When a Party or Lawyer has Made a Large Campaign Contribution (Wis. June 
30, 2017), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=192530; see also, 
Alan Greenblatt, Improper Influence? Who, Us?, GOVERNING (Dec. 2017), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-wisconsin-supreme-court-improper-influence.html. 
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stronger recusal mechanisms when it comes to campaign contributions. While my 
proposed reforms would apply to all Wisconsin judges, I focus my analysis on state 
supreme court justices. 
B.  Requirement of a Written, Reasoned, and Transparent Recusal Decision 
First, justices and judges should be required to write and issue a well-
reasoned, transparent recusal decision to be entered into the record regardless of 
whether recusal or disqualification occurs. As the current Wisconsin disqualification 
rule stands, a judge only files a written decision as to the reasons for 
disqualification when it does occur.111 I propose that there always be a written 
decision, including whenever a party requests recusal or if a fellow justice calls for 
it. This proposal gives justices the opportunity to reason out their decisions any 
time their impartially is called into question.  
Social science has shown that judges have implicit biases, but the hope is 
that judges and justices can limit the outward appearance of bias through a written 
record.112 Opinion writing is familiar to judges, and this proposed solution would 
allow justices to deliberate and rationalize any intuitive decision they make.113 A 
written decision allows judges to articulate their decision, assess their decision 
logically, and explain how their decision was reached.114 Judges are humans too, 
and they are subject to cognitive biases that can affect their thought process and 
decision making.115 Judges can become overconfident in their ability to be impartial 
in situations where a bias or conflict might exist.116 Thus, a written decision can 
lessen the reliance on implicit biases.117 
The Brennan Center and the Institute for the Advancement of the American 
Legal System (IAALS) also propose a transparent, written decision because it 
preserves judicial legitimacy and facilitates appellate review if and when 
necessary.118 When a written decision is on the record and available to the public, 
that decision can be scrutinized by judges and the public, giving insight into the 
 
111  WIS. STAT. § 757.19(5) (2019). 
112  See Lance D. Reich, Cognitive Biases: Make Judges & Juries Believe Weird Things, SCITECH 
LAW., Fall 2013, at 5, 5.  
113  See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How 
it Affects Judgement and What Judges Can Do About It, in AM. BAR ASS’N, ENHANCING JUSTICE: 
REDUCING BIAS 87, 118 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
114  See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced, and 
Foreign Judges, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 104 (2015). 
115  See Reich, supra note 112. 
116  See Geyh, supra note 5.  
117  See Wistrich & Rachlinksi, supra note 113.  
118  See MATTHEW MENENDEZ & DOROTHY SAMUELS, JUDICIAL RECUSAL REFORM: TOWARD 
INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF DISQUALIFICATION 1, 11 (2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial_Recusal_Reform.pdf; 
WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 3, 30.  
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judge’s mind that we might not otherwise have.119 This also helps hold judges 
accountable.120 Moreover, a written and transparent decision detailing the reasons 
for recusal—or lack thereof—provides a written record for meaningful review, the 
absence of which frustrates the already difficult task of ascertaining what guided a 
judge’s recusal decision.121  
This problem was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s response to West 
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin’s concurring opinion in Caperton v. 
Massey. In a series of opinions through the procedural history of the case, Justice 
Benjamin reasoned that his recusal was unnecessary since he claimed to have 
probed his actual motives and inclinations and did not find any bias.122 He went on 
to write that the plaintiff in the case failed to provide any objective evidence to 
indicate otherwise and that the plaintiff had merely shown a subjective belief of 
bias.123 In its response to Justice Benjamin, the U.S. Supreme Court properly stated 
how difficult it is to inquire into actual bias because the inquiry is often a private 
one.124 Requiring a written recusal decision is needed to protect "against a judge 
who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the 
case” since there is no proper way to measure or review a judge’s actual bias.125  
Public confidence in the judiciary declines if the public has the perception 
that a judge has been influenced by campaign spending to rule in favor of the party 
he or she gained support from. Justice Benjamin seemed to understand this 
sentiment.126 However, if judges do not perceive themselves to have a bias in the 
first place, they will favor facts that correspond to this belief and disregard 
circumstantial evidence to the contrary. This is what social scientists call 
 
119  See generally Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion 
Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237 (2008).  
120  WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 10. 
121  See generally Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial 
Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 760 (2010) (discussing the problems and lack 
of guidance that exist with the federal judicial disqualification scheme).  
122  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2009) (providing a summary of Justice 
Benjamin’s various opinions in the case). 
123  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 292–93 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J., 
concurring). 
124  556 U.S. at 883. 
125  Id. 
126  [T]he public's confidence in our system of justice is necessarily undermined and the 
stability and predictability of the rule of law is compromised when politics cross the 
threshold of our Court. The most important factors therefore affecting the public's 
perception of actual justice in this Court necessarily are the actual decisions of this Court, 
and its members, over time, the professional demeanor of this Court's members, and the 
quality of the written opinions and orders which we produce in specific cases. 
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 286 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J., concurring), rev’d, 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
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confirmation bias.127 Measures must be taken to avoid a judge’s preexisting 
attitudes forming impressions that negatively affect the judge’s evaluation of the 
evidence in rendering decisions.128 Moreover, written decisions help provide 
guidance to judges making similar recusal decisions in the future and facilitate data 
collection on recusal activity.129 A written, transparent decision will help increase 
public confidence in the Wisconsin judiciary.  
C. Independent Review of Recusal Motions 
i. En Banc Review 
Studies have shown that allowing a judge to rule on his or her own recusal 
motion is filled with the dangers of perceived or actual unfairness and with 
unconscious bias.130 First, I recommend that the Wisconsin Supreme Court overrule 
State v. Henley’s holding that the recusal decision is the sole responsibility of the 
individual justice for whom disqualification is sought, and that a majority of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court does not have the power to disqualify a justice from 
adjudicating a case.131 Working off the assumption that State v. Henley no longer 
applies, my second proposed reform would be to create an independent review of a 
justice’s recusal decision and of recusal motions. 
Removing a justice from the recusal decision-making process is a simple way 
to ensure meaningful independent review of recusal decisions and motions. One 
model the Wisconsin Supreme Court can adopt is Texas’ review of recusal motions 
at the supreme court level. In Texas, “the challenged justice or judge must either 
remove himself or herself from all participation in the case or certify the matter to 
the entire court, which will decide the motion by a majority of the remaining judges 
sitting en banc.”132 The Brennan Center and IAALS find the rule appealing because 
it excludes judges from the deliberative process by avoiding tainting any part of 
it.133 A rule like this also removes whatever hesitation there might be from other 
justices to vote on a warranted recusal out of the need to maintain a collegial 
working environment.134 Given the highly polarized court, the adoption of 
Wisconsin’s current recusal rule in 2010, and control by a conservative majority, it 
seems unlikely the Wisconsin Supreme Court would adopt such a rule.  
 
127  See Eyal Peer & Eyal Gamliel, Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions, 49 CT. REV. 114, 114–
15 (2013) (“This confirmation bias makes people search, code, and interpret information in a 
manner consistent with their assumptions.”). 
128  See GEYH, supra note 7, at 59–60. 
129  Id. 
130  Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule On a Judicial 
Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 680 (2015); see also Geyh, supra note 5. 
131  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853. 
132  TEX. R. APP. PROC. 16.3(b). 
133  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 9–10; WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 8. 
134  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 12. 
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ii. An Independent Commission 
A better alternative would be for Wisconsin to establish an independent 
commission made up of retired justices and judges to consider recusal decisions. 
Similar reforms are advocated by the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence and the IAALS.135 These commissions should be created by 
government officials and lawyers with various political views to make the selection 
process for the commission as fair as possible. In order to ensure independence, 
additional safeguards should be implemented when creating and selecting the 
retired justices and judges who will serve on the commission. The commission’s 
purpose should be aimed at ensuring the impartiality and independence of the 
judiciary. To work toward this purpose, retired judges and justices seeking to serve 
on the commission should have no record in their past that could call their 
impartiality into question.136 It would be best to keep any non-lawyers or practicing 
lawyers out of the commission for lack of expertise in the judicial decision making 
process and because they could become parties to a case before the court. Likewise, 
current judges should be excluded as any of their decisions might come before the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court on appeal.137  
The commission should be made up entirely of retired justices and judges. By 
including only judges, we can assure that the commission has the proper expertise 
that retired judges bring from their experiences on the bench.138 Retired justices 
and judges will ideally continue to be impartial and hold themselves to the same 
standards as when they were on the bench.139 There definitely seems to be support 
 
135  See ABA Standing Comm. on Judicial Indep., Resolution 107 (2011), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_107.pdf (“[T]he 
American Bar Association urges states to establish clearly articulated procedures for: (1) Judicial 
disqualification determinations; and (2) Prompt review by another judge or tribunal, or as 
otherwise provided by law or rule of court, of denials of requests to disqualify a judge.”); see also 
WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 8. 
136  For example, a judge should not have joined any organization with strong ideological beliefs, 
made disparaging comments against a party, or articulated his or her views on any number of 
issues in any manner. The selection for judges can be based on criteria similar to that set out by 
the IAALS, which includes “legal ability, integrity, and impartiality, communication skills, 
professionalism and temperament, and administrative capacity.” INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE REVISITED: AN UPDATED BLUEPRINT FOR 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 1, 7 (2016), 
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/transparent_courthouse_revisited.
pdf. 
137  See id. at 4. 
138  Id. 
139  See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Compliance with the Code of Conduct (C) Retired Judge 
(JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-
conduct-united-states-judges#g (promoting continued adherence to ethics canons by retired 
federal judges). 
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for this idea from the retired Wisconsin judges’ 2017 petition.140 I believe that 
retired justices and judges would be willing to become a part of this commission. 
 The commission should provide meaningful review of recusal motions and 
decisions as if they were on appeal. Review should be done by a panel with at least 
one retired justice. Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court is the state’s court of last 
resort, a commission with a panel of retired justices would keep the recusal motion 
from having to be reviewed by lower level judges who may have some hesitation to 
rule on a decision made by a higher-level judge. A decision reviewed by a panel that 
includes at least one retired justice will give the review and decision more 
legitimacy since current justices would ideally respect a review from peers they hold 
to the same level of competence, esteem and prestige.141 Lastly, I propose that the 
panel be set up on a rotation system and that review be anonymous to avoid any 
resentment among judges.  
This reform also addresses many of the criticisms from reviewing recusal 
motions on appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court will be able to focus on resolving 
cases with novel legal issues or those that have no clear legal precedent that make 
their way up to the state’s highest court. Recusal review by a panel of retired judges 
would alleviate concerns that recusal review is a waste of judicial resources142 
because the decision would be made outside the court system. 
D.  Judicial Performance Evaluations 
The independent commission should track the number of recusal motions and 
decisions filed, the number of times justices properly chose to recuse themselves, 
and the number of times they did not. This information should be saved, compiled, 
and made available to the public through judicial performance evaluations. 
Statistics about judicial performance aid voters in deciding whether to re-elect a 
justice and are crucial to restoring the public’s confidence in the judiciary.  
Judicial performance evaluations help address a few of the “Axiom of 80” 
problems described by law professor Charles G. Geyh.143 The Axiom of 80 refers to 
the political reality that: 
(1) Roughly 80% of the public prefers to select its judges by election 
and does so; (2) Roughly 80% of the electorate does not vote in judicial 
elections; (3) Roughly 80% of the electorate cannot identify the 
 
140  The judges who submitted the petition “include[d] 12 former Chief Judges appointed by the 
Supreme Court, and retired circuit and appellate court judges.” Press Release, Coalition of 
Retired Judges to Ask Wisconsin Supreme Court to Adopt Standards to Limit Cash Influence in 
Judiciary, URB. MILWAUKEE (Jan. 12, 2017, 2:07 PM), 
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/coalition-of-retired-judges-to-ask-wisconsin-supreme-
court-to-adopt-standards-to-limit-cash-influence-in-judiciary/; see also Petition 17-01, supra note 
105. 
141  See GEYH, supra note 7, at 59 (noting that judges can be influenced by the audiences whose 
approval they seek). 
142  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 12. 
143  See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52–55 (2003). 
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candidates for judicial office; and (4) Roughly 80% of the public 
believes that when judges are elected, their decisions are influenced 
by the campaign contributions they receive.144  
More specifically, evaluations can help inform the public about which judicial 
candidates have received campaign contributions in the past, the aggregate amount 
of those contributions, and if those contributions led to any potential conflicts of 
interest. This can help alleviate some of the public’s concern that financial 
contributions buy influence. The hope is that the public will regain confidence in the 
judiciary by becoming better informed about the candidates and by feeling that they 
made an informed decision in casting their vote. Likewise, Wisconsin justices should 
be provided resources to help them properly identify recusal issues and how their 
actions shape public perception.  
The standards by which a justice is evaluated should include: integrity, legal 
knowledge, communication skills, judicial temperament, administrative 
performance, and service to the legal profession and the public. For example, 
Colorado has judicial performance evaluations that the public may use to determine 
if a judge has met judicial standards when he or she is up for reelection.145 Should 
Wisconsin accept such standards of evaluation, we should see an improvement in 
the demeanor of the judiciary as a whole, improving both the collegiality among 
justices and public confidence in the judiciary.  
Other states have similar performance evaluation systems for judges who are 
on judicial retention election ballots.146 Because judges in Wisconsin are all elected 
and can run for reelection,147 the proposed commission’s data collected over time 
concerning judicial conduct and discipline boast potential added benefits. Judges 
may worry about their reputation among their peers and will (hopefully) choose to 
recuse themselves in cases where they clearly have a conflict of interest. A negligent 
recusal decision can call into question a judge’s ability to perceive such problems.148 
This point is particularly important for judges who are looking to advance their 
 
144  Id. at 52. 
145  COLO. COMM’N JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov (last visited 
April 28, 2020). 
146  See ARIZ. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REV., https://www.azcourts.gov/jpr/Judicial-
Performance-Reports (last visited Oct. 3, 2018); Voter’s Guide to Nebraska’s Judicial Retention 
Elections, NEB. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/public/vote (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2018). 
147  See Methods of Judicial Selection: Wisconsin, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=WI 
(last visited May 12, 2020). The Wisconsin Constitution prescribes the selection, retention 
methods, and term lengths for judges. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 5-6. 
148  See GEYH, supra note 7, at 59 (“Judge Alex Kozinski has argued that judges’ desire for the 
respect of their colleagues operates as a brake on decision-making that strays too far from the 
rule of law.”); see also James Sample, Retention Elections 2.010, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 402–05 
(2011). 
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careers and want the respect of their peers.149 Judicial evaluations can also better 
inform voters in retention elections with objective information regarding the judge’s 
performance and behaviors.150 Thus, performance evaluation systems help deter the 
influence from campaign contributions by creating incentives for judges to recuse 
themselves when their supporters or contributors come before them. 
E. Mechanism for Replacing Disqualified Justices 
Wisconsin prescribes the reason for its recusal rule in the comment to Rule 
60.04(7) stating that the court has a tradition of electing judges, and that recusal for 
campaign support “would deprive citizens who lawfully contribute to judicial 
campaigns whether individually or through an organization, of access to the judges 
they help elect.”151 This is precisely the problem. The final suggestion I have is to 
establish a clear and practical mechanism within the judicial system for replacing 
disqualified justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.152 When there are no 
mechanisms to replace disqualified justices, the court runs the risk of a tie vote153 
and issues left unresolved.  
One approach, endorsed by the Brennan Center and the IAALS, to replace a 
disqualified justice is found in Florida’s Manual of Internal Operating Procedures 
section X(D).154 Under Florida’s approach, “associate justices shall be the chief 
judges of the district courts of appeal selected on a rotating basis from the lowest 
numbered court to the highest and repeating continuously. If more than one 
associate justice is needed, they shall be selected from separate district courts 
according to the numerical rotation.”155 A mechanism like Florida’s could work in 
Wisconsin, given the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s current composition. Justices have 
not recused themselves in at least ninety-eight percent of cases involving a 
 
149  See Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993 (1993), reprinted in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 63, 73 
(David M. O’Brien ed., 1997). 
150  See Geyh, supra note 94, at 1279. See generally Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation 
Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001). 
151  See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7) cmt. 
152  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 13–15; WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 12–
13.  
153  The Wisconsin Supreme Court will issue a per curiam decision affirming the court of appeals in 
cases where the court is equally divided. See Anne-Louise T. Mittal, Overview of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s 2017-18 Term, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: WIS. APP. L. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/10/overview-of-the-wisconsin-supreme-
courts-201718-te; see also Smith v. Kleynerman, 2017 WI 22, 374 Wis. 2d 1, 892 N.W.2d 734; 
New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 WI 106, 365 Wis.2d 610, 875 N.W.2d 107. 
154  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 13; WHEELER & REDDICK, supra note 6, at 12. 
155  FLA. SUPREME COURT, THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES § X(D) (2016), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/documents/IOPs.pdf. 
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contributor to their election campaigns.156 Florida’s approach prevents parties from 
seeking to replace a justice who is likely to rule unfavorably with a more favorable 
justice through strategic use of the recusal rules.157 Thus, the rotating system also 
helps prevent charges that a replacement justice was chosen because they are likely 
to issue a favorable ruling.158 A rotating system allows the ideological lines in the 
current court to not play as big of a role in deciding cases while ensuring a full 
roster of justices hear any particular case. 
Alternatively, Wisconsin can adopt a standard similar to Kansas, which 
replaces a disqualified justice with a retired justice designated by the Kansas 
Supreme Court to ensure a full bench at all times.159 This approach would go hand 
in hand with the independent commission I suggested above. For this replacement 
mechanism to be effective, it is necessary for the replacement justice to be free from 
conflicts. Perhaps having an automatic rotation system of retired justices here 
would also prevent strategic recusal motions from parties. Including a retired 
justice as the replacement justice would help ensure finality to all cases adjudicated 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  
At a minimum, it is important that the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopt a 
mechanism by which it replaces a disqualified judge in cases of ethical violations. 
As previously described, there have been at least two previous incidents when the 
Wisconsin justices were deadlocked in disciplinary charges.160 Replacing justices in 
disciplinary cases is important because it helps prevent justices from using 
distasteful (yet true) statements in issue advertisements during re-election 
campaigns. Having a replacement judge step in when cases like the chock-hold 
incident arise161 also ensures the issue will be resolved and the offending justice will 
be punished. At the very least, a justice will be deterred from committing similar 
actions in the future. This can help restore public confidence by ensuring that all 
justices are held accountable for their actions and helps restore collegiality and 
respect among them. These reforms are just a starting point for the Wisconsin 
courts and legislature in crafting a new recusal rule.  
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT STORY 
The case study of the Wisconsin Supreme Court serves as a warning for other 
states that have not heeded the call of the ABA and other institutions to reform 
 
156  See Jake Harper, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors, WIS. WATCH 
(Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2013/10/wisconsin-supreme-court-justices-tend-
to-favor-attorney-donors/. 
157  See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 118, at 13. 
158  See FLA. SUPREME COURT, THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES § X(D) (2016), supra note 155. 
159  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2616 (2016).  
160  See James, supra note 54.  
161  See Gil Halsted, Wis. Justices Deadlocked Over Chokehold Allegations, NPR (May 11, 2012, 3:00 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/05/11/152520957/wis-justices-deadlocked-over-chokehold-
allegation. 
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their recusal rule. The effects of Caperton are clearly visible in Wisconsin and many 
other states are seeing judicial elections that are now openly partisan, very 
expensive, and actively influenced by partisan interest groups.162 Electing well 
qualified justices loses its effect when lobbying groups like WMC spend money in 
elections that clearly surpass the amount of a justice’s own campaign budget.163 
This surely rises to the level of violating due process as Justice Kennedy’s majority 
Caperton opinion stated.  
It is imperative to keep corporations and interest groups from seeing money 
as an investment and a means to influence a judicial candidate when the issues 
they are interested in come before the court.164 Conservative business-oriented 
interest groups are well aware of the leverage they can gain in having the “right” 
judge elected to the bench. For instance, prior to the 2013 Wisconsin Supreme Court 
election, WMC issued a Supreme Court edition of its “Business Voice” magazine 
with a two-page article about business interests in the judicial election.165 The 
article warned its readers that “all the reforms of Governor Scott Walker and the 
business community would hang in the balance” if Justice Roggensack lost and the 
court lost its conservative majority.166 Wisconsin is just one example of this type of 
lobbying, and one can look at judicial elections in other states to see how 
widespread this issue really is.167 
Interest groups placing millions of dollars in state judicial campaigns to 
further their own agendas is not a new phenomenon. Campaign contributions first 
saw a dramatic increase in state supreme courts in the 1990s.168 Beginning in the 
1980s and 1990s, Karl Rove, a political consultant, began working with the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce to influence the outcome of key judicial elections.169 The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce is a membership organization of some of the largest 
 
162  See KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE 
HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 6 (2010). 
163  See Wisconsin’s Largest Corporate Lobby Seeks to Buy a Justice: WMC Spending $1 Million to 
Purchase Supreme Court Candidate Michael Schenock, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WIS. (Mar. 23, 
2018), http://www.wisdems.org/news/wmc-spends-1-million-to-buy-justice. 
164  See Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An Opening for Quid Pro Quo Corruption: Issue 
Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races Before and After Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 305, 319 (2015). 
165  See Rick Esenberg, The Democratic Process is at Stake, WIS. BUS. VOICE, Mar. 2013, at 14, 14–15, 
https://www.prwatch.org/files/businessvoice_specialedition2013-med.pdf. 
166  Id. 
167  See Press Release, New Analysis: 2016 Judicial Elections See Secret Money and Heightened 
Outside Spending, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-analysis-2016-judicial-elections-see-secret-
money-and-heightened-outside-spending (discussing the politicized and high-dollar races in 
Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington). 
168  See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHO IS TO JUDGE? THE PERENNIAL DEBATE OVER WHETHER TO 
ELECT OR APPOINT AMERICA'S JUDGES 67 (2019). 
169  Joseph Tanfani, Judicial Elections Getting More Political with New Campaign Spending, LA 
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-judicial-elections-
20141123-story.html. 
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businesses and is the nation’s largest lobbying group for corporations.170 Rove was 
partly responsible for the turnover in the Texas Supreme Court by ensuring 
conservative judges had well-funded campaigns to entrench pro-business interests 
who “took a hard line on injury and product-liability cases.”171 
From 2000 to 2008, the supreme courts of Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Ohio, and West Virginia also shifted favor from trial lawyers and unions to 
corporate interests, largely because businesses and conservative groups funded and 
organized state judicial races.172 Some notable examples of interest groups 
mounting expensive campaigns and paying for ads that negatively portrayed a 
judge’s judicial record include the 2000 Mississippi Supreme Court judicial 
election173 and the 2014 North Carolina Supreme Court race.174 Third-party 
lobbying groups clearly have their own incentives for contributing large amounts of 
money to a justice’s campaign. Obviously, these interests do not include attaining 
an impartial judiciary that advances the rule of law. 
Interest groups have good reason to contribute large amounts of money 
through independent expenditures instead of donating to that candidate’s campaign 
committee directly. One of those reasons is that by organizing independent 
campaigns, interest groups control the campaign’s message directly instead of the 
campaign committee controlling the message itself.175 A more important reason is 
that direct contributions to judicial campaigns are subject to state-imposed 
contribution limits, which is not the case with independent expenditures on a 
candidate’s behalf.176 After the 2010 Citizens United ruling, spending by 
independent organizations and political parties reached an all-time high at twenty-
seven percent of the total spending on judicial campaigns in the 2011–2012 election 
cycle and then twenty-nine percent in the 2013–2014 election cycle.177 The money 
coming into state supreme court elections has helped increase the use of campaign 
 
170  See Top Spenders, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=s (last updated Apr. 22, 2020).  
171  Opinion, Big Money Taints Judicial Elections, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/big-money-taints-judicial-elections/. 
172  Id. 
173  Former Justice Oliver Diaz of the Mississippi Supreme Court was up for reelection in 2000. 
Because he was not considered “pro-business” and due to his resistance to tort reform, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce sought to remove him from the court by purchasing extensive amounts of 
airtime and paying for ads that negatively distorted his judicial record. Despite the odds, Diaz 
ended up winning the 2000 election. See HOT COFFEE (HBO 2011). 
174  In 2014, Justice Robin E. Hudson of the North Carolina Supreme Court was targeted by the 
Republican State Leadership Committee, “which spent $4 million nationwide on an effort to tilt 
state courts in a conservative direction.” One campaign ad targeting Justice Hudson stated that 
she sided with child predators and was not tough on child molesters. Justice Hudson survived 
the attacks and won the election. Tanfani, supra note 169.  
175  See GEYH, supra note 168, at 70. 
176  Id. 
177  Id.; see also SCOTT GREYTAK, ALICIA BANNON, ALLYSE FALCE & LINDA CASEY, BANKROLLING THE 
BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–14, at 9 (Laurie Kinney ed., 2015). 
292 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [8:2 
 
ads in nonpartisan supreme court elections. The modern era of judicial elections has 
seen a rise in the percentage of supreme court campaigns featuring television ads 
and “[i]nfusions of campaign cash have enabled candidates and their supporters to 
buy bigger megaphones with which to deliver a meaner message.”178 
In Wisconsin, research suggests that there is a correlation between the 
donations that Wisconsin justices receive and favorable outcomes in cases brought 
before the court: the court rules for vested interests over fifty percent of the time.179 
Other state supreme court justices are aware of this to some extent. In 2006, retired 
West Virginia Chief Justice Richard Neely stated, “[i]t’s pretty hard in big-money 
races not to take care of your friends.”180 In the past decade there have been 
numerous other examples of the effects of big money on state judicial elections and 
the failure of justices to recuse themselves. In contrast, former Alabama Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobbs recently wrote: “I never quite got over the 
feeling of being trapped inside a system whose very structure left me feeling 
disgusted. I assure you: I’ve never made a decision in a case in which I sided with a 
party because of a campaign donation.”181 Cobbs became the first female Chief 
Justice in Alabama, winning in the most expensive campaign but quickly realizing 
the restrictions that big money has on judicial autonomy.182 In the modern era of 
judicial elections, the Republican party has gained control of many supreme courts 
in southern states and business interests are prevailing in making the states’ 
highest courts more business-friendly and sympathetic to their causes.183 
Strong recusal rules are needed for judicial integrity. If states with weak 
recusal rules do not amend their rules, there is the possibility that justices and 
judges will violate more ethics rules which could result in more disciplinary 
hearings that waste judicial time and resources. This also affects the justices’ 
working relationship with one another. Moreover, there are various due process 
concerns that arise. Transparent campaign disclosures are important for all parties 
involved. A judge needs to know where the funding is coming from to properly 
assess if recusal is necessary. Litigants need to know about donors and 
contributions if they are to properly raise due process concerns.184 The public needs 
to know about campaign contributions to avoid believing that favorable decisions 
 
178  GEYH, supra note 168, at 71; see also MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN 
ADVERTISING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 75 (2015) (“Attack advertising—
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can be bought by those with deep pockets. Thus, judges need continuous education 
regarding their duties of upholding the rule of law, adhering to the Model Rules of 
Judicial Conduct, and identifying their biases, particularly in the context of 
campaign spending. Likewise, there needs to be transparency when it comes to the 
millions of dollars being funneled into judicial elections and public education about 
a judge’s role. These recommendations would hold judges accountable and 
strengthen trust in the legal system. 
V. WHERE ARE WE NOW: RECENT WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 
A. The 2018 Wisconsin Supreme Court Judicial Election 
By 2018, the effects of campaign contributions and the recusal rules on 
Wisconsin’s judiciary were clear. Statements were made calling for Wisconsin voters 
to vote and have their voices heard regarding the recusal standards for judges 
receiving large campaign contributions.185 The 2018 election for the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court seat was a race between Rebecca Dallet, a Milwaukee County 
Circuit Judge, and Michael Screnock, a Sauk County Circuit Judge. While the race 
was officially nonpartisan, the race followed its predecessors and fell along partisan 
lines.186 
Judge Dallet campaigned largely on changing the rules governing when 
Wisconsin judges or justices should recuse themselves from hearing cases involving 
top campaign donors to prevent the court from doing their bidding.187 Among her 
top priorities were revisiting the court’s recusal rules and holding a hearing to 
amend those rules.188 During the final weeks of debates, Judge Dallet promised to 
recuse herself from hearing cases involving Eric Holder Jr., the former attorney 
general who heavily supported her campaign.189 When Judge Dallet asked her 
opponent, Judge Screnock, to promise voters he would also recuse himself from 
hearing cases involving WMC, one of his main campaign supporters, Judge 
Screnock said he would not make that kind of promise.190 WMC had spent almost $1 
 
185  See Cap Times Editorial, supra note 37. 
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million in the election.191 Judge Dallet recognized that WMC’s large contributions 
created the perception or expectation of favorable rulings on its behalf.  
 On April 3, 2018, Judge Dallet beat Judge Screnock for a seat on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to serve her ten-year term.192 By replacing the 
conservative Justice Michael Gableman, the court slightly shifted from a 5-2 
conservative control to a 4-3 majority. Justice Dallet attributed her win to 
Wisconsin voters and the notion that they were ready to stand up to special interest 
groups like WMC and regain an independent court.193 Her comments continued to 
be consistent in recognizing that the current recusal rule on campaign contributions 
is a problem. Electing Justice Dallet seemed to be a major step for voters toward 
restoring the impartiality and legitimacy of the judiciary. Democrats echoed the 
same sentiment, approved of the win, and seemed (apparently) eager for campaign 
finance reform.194 However, this victory was short lived.  
B.  The 2019 Wisconsin Supreme Court Judicial Election 
After forty-three years on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Abrahamson 
retired from the bench in July 2019.195 The open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court led to another contested race between conservative- and liberal-backed 
candidates. The race was between Appeals Court Judge Brian Hagedorn and 
Wisconsin Chief Appeals Court Judge Lisa Neubauer. As expected, millions of 
dollars were spent on each candidate’s campaign as both liberals and conservatives 
knew what was at stake—control of the court. Liberal groups spent about $1.6 
million to support Neubauer while conservative groups spent about $1.2 million 
supporting Hagedorn, on top of what each candidate had spent, $1.7 million and 
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$1.3 million respectively.196  Partisan groups supporting each candidate saw a win 
for the opposing side as a win for that candidate’s political party.197 The election 
was the most expensive the state had seen in the last decade.198 
Both candidates presented very different approaches to the law, but both saw 
the importance of a judge’s impartiality and restoring legitimacy in the state’s 
highest court.199 However, in addressing Wisconsin’s current recusal rule during 
each respective campaign, Judge Hagedorn indicated that he was not supportive of 
a stronger recusal rule.200 On the other hand, Judge Neubauer stated that stronger 
rules should be considered and that she would welcome a public hearing for more 
input.201  
After a close race in the April 2019 election, Judge Hagedorn defeated Judge 
Neubauer by 6,000 votes.202 The state supreme court power shifted back to a 5-2 
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https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/wisconsin-supreme-court-race-too-close-to-
call-possibly-headed/article_2c4348ed-eec5-5d69-9aa1-209fe728c3bf.html. 
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bench and had hopes of restoring confidence in the court stating, “People don’t want a liberal and 
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and-politics/lisa-neubauer-wants-to-restore-confidence-in-high-court/article_b7845cfc-0d4f-525d-
8f56-557bb9887381.html. On the other hand, Judge Hagedorn said he would move the court 
away from becoming another type of legislature with partisan views. Riley Vetterkind, Brian 
Hagedorn Seeks to Extinguish Partisan Influence on the Court, WIS. ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/brian-hagedorn-seeks-to-extinguish-
partisan-influence-on-court/article_58bf0fc7-135f-5a4a-b50d-ddddb512846c.html. 
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2:51 PM), https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2019/05/23/op-ed-hagedorn-shows-why-recusal-rule-
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conservative majority. Despite his comments about wanting an impartial judiciary, 
Judge Hagedorn went on to address the Republican Party of Wisconsin state 
convention, specifically thanking Republican activists for their support and, 
ultimately, his win.203  
In this election, liberal groups outspent conservative groups when it came to 
financing the campaign for Judge Neubauer.204 Previous large contributors like 
WMC, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Wisconsin Realtors Association 
(WRA) sat out primarily due to some of Judge Hagedorn’s expressed views.205 
Moreover, given that the Democrats ousted governor Scott Walker in the 2018 
midterm election, it appeared that Judge Hagedorn, the underdog, would lose the 
election. However, it was now-Justice Hagedorn that emerged victorious.206 Some 
political scientists attribute the conservative win in part to the overt liberal attacks 
against Judge Hagedorn’s religious views because he founded a Christian school 
with traditional views on marriage and sex.207 It seemed these attacks helped 
motivate voters to come to the polls against the media ads attacking Judge 
Hagedorn regardless of what their religious beliefs were.208  
Perhaps it is becoming clearer to voters that what the state needs is an 
impartial judiciary, and their votes in the 2019 election seems to send a message 
that they will not stand for clear ideological attacks from political groups supporting 
either party. Despite outside spending from liberal interest groups favoring her, 
Judge Neubauer attributed this loss to the large amounts of campaign and ad 
money and acknowledged that large contribution amounts are not good for our 
democracy.209 
C.  The April 2020 Wisconsin Supreme Court Judicial Election 
The most recent Wisconsin Supreme Court election took place on April 7, 
2020. The election determined who would take the open seat on the bench once 
 
neubauer-concedes-supreme-court-race/3410456002/. The race was close enough that it almost 
headed for a recount. The Latest: Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Too Close to Call, US NEWS 
(Apr. 3, 2019, 12:48 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/wisconsin/articles/2019-04-
02/the-latest-wisconsin-voters-picking-supreme-court-justice.  
203  Heck, supra note 200. 
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207  See Matt Batzel, Why the Wisconsin Supreme Court Win Is a Big Deal, REAL CLEAR POL. (Apr. 13, 
2019), 
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Justice Daniel Kelly’s term on the court expires in July 2020.210 The race was 
between the conservative-backed incumbent, Justice Daniel Kelly, and the liberal-
backed Dane County Circuit Court Judge Jill Karofsky.211 Again, this race was 
officially nonpartisan, but in name only.  
The election followed the same partisan trend as all those in the last 
decade.212 Justice Kelly received endorsements from the Republican party and the 
judges’ ideologies were clearly divided along partisan lines.213 According to the 
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, political parties and special interest groups spent 
almost $5 million on advertising: “Karofsky benefited from $2.4 million in spending 
and Kelly [from] $2.5 million.”214 The Democratic Party of Wisconsin also 
contributed $1.3 million to Judge Karofsky’s campaign.215 
On the topic of recusal, Justice Kelly was criticized by liberal groups and his 
opponents for ruling for conservative interests and Republican causes.216 He stated 
that he would not necessarily recuse himself from a case involving a donor before 
him because state law allows a judge to hear a case in which a contributor donates 
up to $20,000.217 Judge Karofsky, on the other hand, stated she would call for 
hearings to determine a clear rule as to when a justice should step away from a 
case, especially when a party in the case is a also a political donor.218 Judge 
Karofsky’s philosophy on recusal would be to take herself off cases whenever there 
is an appearance of impropriety.219  
The way the Wisconsin Supreme Court 2020 election played out is one for the 
history books. The general election was scheduled on the same day as the Wisconsin 
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presential primary, where Democratic turnout was expected to be high.220 Liberals 
hoped that a win by Judge Karofsky would give them a chance to retake the 
majority of the court in 2023, when conservative-supported Chief Justice Patience 
Roggensack’s term expires. 221  Otherwise, conservatives would hold the majority 
until at least 2025.222 A win for either side was important in developing a majority 
on the court in the coming election years.  
No one could have anticipated what happened next. On March 12, 2020, 
Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers signed Executive Order Number 72, declaring a 
public health emergency due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak throughout 
the world, including the United States.223 On March 13, 2020, President Donald 
Trump declared the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency.224 Like many states, 
Wisconsin took action issuing a series of Executive Orders including a “Safer at 
Home” order to help reduce the spread of the virus.225 On April 6, 2020 Governor 
Evers signed Executive Order Number 74, suspending in-person voting for the April 
7, 2020 election until June 9, 2020, unless the legislature passed a different date for 
in-person voting, for the safety of all Wisconsinites.226 The Executive Order allowed 
Wisconsinites to continue to request and mail in absentee ballots consistent with 
Wisconsin Statutes.227 However, by a 4-2 conservative majority, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court issued an order enjoining Executive Order Number 74 on the 
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grounds that Governor Evers did not have “the authority to suspend or rewrite state 
election laws.”228 Justice Ann W. Bradley put it best when she wrote in her 
dissenting opinion, “the majority gives Wisconsinites an untenable choice: endanger 
your safety and potentially your life by voting or give up your right to vote by 
heeding the recent and urgent warnings about the fast growing pandemic.”229  
On April 6, 2020, the U. S. Supreme Court also issued a decision along 
ideological lines with a conservative majority, holding that mail ballots that arrived 
after Election Day must either be postmarked by Election Day, and received by 4:00 
pm on April 13, 2020 to count.230 The decision cut the week extension given to 
voting residents to cast absentee ballots as long as the ballots were postmarked by 
April 13.231 Thus, the April 7 election would proceed against the advice of public 
health experts. Those who had not requested or received their absentee ballots on 
time would either “brave the polls, endangering their own and others’ safety[, o]r . . 
. lose their right to vote, through no fault of their own.”232  
Despite the fears associated with the pandemic, Wisconsinites went to the 
polls on April 7, 2020 to vote in the critical races that included the Democratic 
presidential primary and a key state Supreme Court seat.233 The pandemic 
contributed to a record number of people voting by absentee ballot–1,098,489 
absentee ballots were returned by April 13th.234  
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potential for states to allow for voters to cast ballot by mail or absentee ballots in November. See 
Rebecca Klar, Almost 2 in 3 Favor Voting By Mail This November Amid Fraud Concerns: Poll, 
THE HILL (May 12, 2020, 8:13 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/497262-almost-two-
in-three-favor-voting-by-mail-this-november-amid-fraud-concerns; Mohamed Younis, Most 




233  See Astead W. Herndon & Alexander Burns, Voting in Wisconsin During a Pandemic: Lines, 
Masks and Plenty of Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-election-coronavirus.html. 
234  Absentee Ballot Statistics for April 7, WIS. ELECTIONS COMMISSION, 
https://elections.wi.gov/node/6765 (last visited May 17, 2020).  
300 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [8:2 
 
On April 13, 2020, a week after the election, it was announced that Jill 
Karofsky defeated conservative incumbent Daniel Kelly, 55.28 percent to 44.72 
percent, reducing the conservative majority on the court to 4-3.235 The use of 
absentee ballots created controversy regarding absentee ballots not arriving in time 
or getting lost in the mail and the potentially large number of disenfranchised 
voters.236  
The 2020 judicial election was set against a backdrop of clear partisan 
politics. Judge Karofsky’s win followed the Republican Legislature and 
conservative-controlled Wisconsin Supreme Court rejecting Democratic efforts to 
move the date of the election. The ongoing battle continues between Democrats who 
believe that Republicans forcing in-person voting is “voter suppression on steroids” 
and Republicans defending in-person elections amid the pandemic.237 The result of 
the election was a huge win for Democrats, who saw Judge’s Karofsky’s dominant 
win and high voter turnout as positive signs for the upcoming 2020 presential 
election.238  
Following her win, Judge Karofsky addressed the series of decisions that took 
place before the election: “Courts making partisan decisions, sending people out to 
vote in the middle of a global pandemic, is exactly what’s wrong with a judiciary 
that has become too political, and I think a deliberate attempt to suppress the vote 
in Wisconsin.”239 Judge Karofsky recognizes that actions like the ones that took 
place during the 2020 election are what undermine the public’s trust in the 
judiciary and damage the court’s reputation. Her win means it could take only a 
single justice to sway the outcome of several important cases that may come before 
the court in the next few years as well as amendments to Wisconsin’s recusal rule.  
CONCLUSION 
The amount of campaign contributions have effectively made it difficult to 
draw a line between partisan politics and the judiciary. Wisconsin attorneys fear 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court cannot rely on campaign finance laws to guard 
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against the appearance of impropriety and ensure due process.240 The Wisconsin 
legislature needs to enact new campaign finance reform statutes that, among other 
things, regulate issue ads.241 How likely is it that the Wisconsin legislature will 
amend its current recusal rules? In the 2018 midterm elections, Tony Evers 
defeated Scott Walker for Wisconsin’s Governor seat. 242 As part of his campaign, 
Evers said he would seek to reform the state’s campaign finance laws and support 
legislation to overturn Citizens United and to clean up Wisconsin’s elections.243 
Recognizing that Walker and the legislature had completely transformed 
Wisconsin’s voting rights and campaign finance laws, Evers hopes to return the 
power to the people.244 
Since Evers’ win, campaign finance reform efforts have become a hot topic in 
Wisconsin with efforts being made to undo the 2015 laws passed by former 
Governor Walker. Soon after Evers’ win, Assembly Democrats laid out a set of 
proposals they said would give Wisconsin a “fresh start,” including bills that would 
limit contributions made by individuals, campaign committees, and political parties. 
245 Among those taking the lead in campaign finance reform is State Senator Chris 
Larson, Democrat from Milwaukee.246 The Brennan Center for Justice recognizes 
how Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws have slid “into a state of decay” and 
recently made recommendations including enacting new legislation for public 
financing and to reduce contribution limits.247 
A big challenge to Governor Evers’ possible reform efforts will be the 
Republican-controlled legislature and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Wisconsin is 
among one the nation’s most politically polarized states and issues like changes to 
the recusal rule may be met with great contention. We have a recent example of 
what may happen when Evers was pushed to the sideline after trying to delay the 
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April 2020 election, “only to see the Republican-controlled state legislature 
immediately challenge him in court, and the state's Supreme Court rule against 
Evers.”248 The Republican legislature then filed a lawsuit challenging Evers’ “Safer 
at Home” emergency order asking the state’s highest court to block it.249 In a 4-3 
decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned Governor Evers’ state's stay-at-
home order, ruling that the state Department of Health Services did not have the 
authority to issue the emergency order.250  It is very possible that many major 
reforms in the near future—including Wisconsin’s current recusal rule—will be met 
with similar challenges from the Republican legislature. At the state level, 
Republicans and the business community may be among those who would present 
the biggest opposition to reforms, especially given that conservative interest groups 
crafted the state’s current recusal rule. 
In order for new laws to survive constitutional challenges, the U.S. Supreme 
Court will have to change direction on its views regarding campaign finance 
legislation.251 Recusal rules that are able to withstand constitutional challenges are 
essential to ensuring due process for litigants.252 It is equally important to recognize 
and acknowledge the new politics of judicial elections and the ability of interest 
groups to influence judicial decisions and affect the autonomy of our state judges. 
By reforming recusal rules on campaign contributions, the Wisconsin legislature 
and judiciary can remove money from the equation, or at least limit it in a 
meaningful way.  
Ultimately, we need bright-line rules, mechanisms, and standards to restore 
the public’s confidence in the judiciary after the substantial campaign contributions 
in state judicial elections over the last decade. 253 I agree with Professor Geyh when 
he writes that “judges need [to] be capable, honest, impartial, and independent 
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enough to further . . . : (1) upholding the law; (2) respecting rules of process; and (3) 
rendering justice.”254 A judicial seat should not be for sale, easily bought by those 
with the deepest pockets. While recusal rules are important in all respects, we also 
need judges with integrity, ability, and proper temperament.255 For there to be 
judicial integrity, there needs to be confidence that a win in a judicial election is a 
solid victory by a qualified candidate who will uphold the rule of law in all respects. 
Given the political nature of many elections now and the highly polarized 
country we live in today, it is imperative that states work to preserve and maintain 
the integrity, independence, and impartiality of their judicial system. This will take 
time and continued efforts. Enacting new campaign finance laws and amending 
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